

REMARKS

Claims 1-37 are pending. Claims 2-3, 7-8, 10-30, 32-33 and 37 are canceled without prejudice. Claims 1, 4-6, 9, 31 and 34-36 are rejected. Claims 1, 6, 31, 35 and 36 are amended for technical clarity. No new matter has been added as a result of the amendments. Applicants reserve the right to prosecute the canceled claims and/or the subject matter contained therein, in one or more divisional/ continuation applications.

RESPONSE TO REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2

Claims 34 and 37 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.

The Examiner states that claim 34 is indefinite “because the language ‘said organosilane’ lacks the proper antecedent basis.” Without acquiescing to the propriety of the rejection, Applicants have amended claim 34 for clarification.

The Examiner states that claim 37 is indefinite because the claim contains trademarks. Without acquiescing to the propriety of the rejection, Applicants have canceled claim 37, thereby rendering the rejection moot.

RESPONSE TO REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 102 AND § 103

Claims 1, 4-6, 9, 31 and 35-37 stand rejected as anticipated under 35 USC § 102 or alternately as obvious under 35 USC § 103 over US 4,127,706 (hereinafter “Martin ‘706”), US 4,043,331 (hereinafter “Martin ‘331”), US 2004/0037813 (hereinafter “Simpson ‘813”), US 2003/0215624 (hereinafter “Layman ‘624”), US 6,800,155 (hereinafter “Senecal ‘155”) and US 2003/0017208 (hereinafter “Ignatious ‘208”). Applicants respectfully traverse the rejections as follows:

Under the patent statute, a patent claim is invalid if the claimed invention is anticipated by a prior art reference under 35 U.S.C. § 102. The Federal Circuit has held that anticipation requires that each and every element of the claimed invention be disclosed in a single prior art reference. *See, e.g., In re Spada*, 911 F.2d 705, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1655 (Fed. Cir. 1990); *Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.*, 868 F.2d 1226, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1913 (Fed. Cir. 1989); *Diversitech Corp. v. Century Steps, Inc.*, 850 F.2d 675, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1988);

Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1986). For anticipation, there must be no difference between the claimed invention and the reference disclosure, as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention. *Scripps Clinic & Res. Found. v. Genentech, Inc.*, 927 F.2d 1665, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).

To establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), **three basic** criteria must be met. First, there must be some suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine the reference teachings. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation of success. Finally, the prior art reference(s) when combined must teach or suggest all of the claim limitations. The teaching or suggestion to make the claimed combination and the reasonable expectation of success must be found in the prior art, and not based on applicant's disclosure. *In re Vaeck*, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

A Motivation to Combine Must Be Shown

Obviousness can only be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art. *In re Fine*, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988). A mere conclusory statement that modifications of the prior art to meet the claimed invention would have been "well within the ordinary skill of the art at the time the claimed invention was made" because the references relied upon teach that all aspects of the claimed invention were individually known in the art is not sufficient to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness without some objective reason to combine the teachings of the references. *Ex parte Levengood*, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1300 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1993). The Federal Circuit in *In re Zurko*, 258 F.3d 1379, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2001), noted that "deficiencies of the cited references cannot be remedied by the Board's general conclusions about what is 'basic knowledge' or 'common sense' to one of ordinary skill in the art. *Id.* at 1697. In other words, *In re Zurko* expressly proscribes any reliance by an examiner on what constitutes the knowledge of one skilled in the art, when the assessment of that knowledge is not based on any evidence in the record. More recently, the Federal Circuit reiterated this position in *In re Lee*, where it took issue with the fact that "neither the examiner nor the Board adequately supported the selection and combination of the ... references to render obvious that which [patentee] described." *In re Lee*, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

If a proposed modification would render the prior art teaching being modified unsatisfactory for its intended purpose, then there is no suggestion or motivation to make the proposed modification. *In re Gordon*, 733 F.2d 900 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

There Must Be a Reasonable Expectation of Success

The prior art can be modified or combined to reject claims as prima facie obvious as long as there is a reasonable expectation of success. *In re Merck & Co., Inc.*, 800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Evidence showing that there is no reasonable expectation of success supports a finding of nonobviousness. *In re Rinehart*, 531 F.2d 1048 (C.C.P.A. 1976).

All Claim Limitations Must Be Taught or Suggested

To establish prima facie obviousness of a claimed invention, all of the claim limitations must be taught or suggested by the prior art. *In re Royka*, 490 F.2d 981 (C.C.P.A. 1974). In other words, “[a]ll words in a claim must be considered in judging the patentability of that claim against the prior art.” *In re Wilson*, 424 F.2d 1382 (C.C.P.A. 1970). If an independent claim is non-obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, then any claim depending therefrom is nonobvious. *In re Fine*, 837 F.2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

Claims 1, 6 and 31 have been amended to recite a fiber comprising a mesoporous molecular sieve that contains an organosilane, a surfactant, at least one acid and at least one alcohol.

The cited references do not teach or suggest a fiber comprising a mesoporous molecular sieve that in turn comprises an organosilane, a surfactant, at least one acid and at least one alcohol.

Since the cited references do not teach each and every element of the claimed invention, they are not a proper basis for a rejection of the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102, Applicants respectfully request the withdrawal of this rejection.

As discussed above, the cited references do not teach all of the claim limitations when considered individually. Furthermore, the combination of the references also does not teach all of the limitations of the claimed invention, as amended. Therefore, the claimed invention is non-obvious over the prior art.

CONCLUSION


In view of the above amendments and arguments, each of the presently pending claims in this application is believed to be in immediate condition for allowance. Accordingly, the Examiner is respectfully requested to pass this application to issue.

This paper is being filed along with a Petition for Three Month Extension of Time. If any additional fees are due, the Commissioner is authorized to charge the additional fees in connection with this paper to our Deposit Account No. 50-0310 (064422-5007US).

Respectfully submitted,

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Dated: December 28, 2007

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